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NOTES.
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO TAKE AWAY

INTENT IN CRIMINAL

CssES.-The State Constitution of Washington contains the following provisions, Art. I, § 3: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law ;" and Art. x, § 21:
"The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Rem. and Bal.
Code, § 2259 provides that insanity is no defence to a charge of
crime, and that whenever in the judgment of the court any person
convicted of a crime shall have been, by reason of his insanity
unable to comprehend the nature of the act, the court may, in its
discretion, direct such person to be confined in one of the state hospitals for treatment.
In the case of State v. Strasburg I the trial Court had refused to
admit evidence tending to prove that the defendant at the'time of
committing the crime was insane and incapable of understanding the
nature and qualityi of his act, and had charged. the jury "that, under
the laws of this State. it is no defense to a criminal charge that the
person charged was at the time of the commission of the offense
unable, by reason of his insanity, idiocy or imbecility, to comprehend
xno Pac.
(252)

R. 102o (igio).
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the nature and quality of the act, or to understand that it was
wrong."

The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the decision on the
grounds that the Code provision contravened Art. x, § 3 of the Constitution, because (i) criminal intent is an essential element of.
crime, and Art. i, § 21. because (2) its effect is to take away from
the jury the question of criminal intent.
The Code provision did not merely take away that intent re-"
quired at common law as a necessary ingredient- to a crime, but said
"the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate;" that is, everyone
who, before the adoption of this Constitution would have possessed
a right to trial by jury, will continue to possess such right. So far
so good: the defendant in State v. Strasburg had a trial by jury.
But does such a trial mean merely the placing of twelve figureheads in a box. or the submitting to them certain evidence long per- mitted and required at common law which goes to the very root of
the defense? It has always been the jury's province to determine,
upon proper evidence, whether or not a man charged with an action
having for its aim the death of another was insane at the time
of committing such action. This is a common law right of the
prisoner, if he can prove insanity he cannot be convicted as he
would otherwise have been convicted, because intent was lacking
to commit the crime. Such question for the jury seems to have
been an inherent part of the functions. But is-it part of the "due
process of law" required by the Constitution before a person shall.
be deprived of life, liberty or property? Does, Art r, -§3 apply to
"due process of law" as known before the adoption of the Constitution, or as changed by statutes after such adoption? The Court says
the constitution itself answers this question in Art. 1, §32: "A
frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual rights."
. If abstracting criminal intent from the elements of crime conflicts with a provision that the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, it also contravenes the due process of law clause, for such
trial by jury is, and always has been in certain cases (of which,
says the Court. this is one). part of the due process of law. The
statement in State ex rel. Mullen v. Doherty.2 "The effect of the
declaration of the Constitution is.
to provide that the right of trial
by jury as it existed in the territory at the time the Constitution
was adopted should be continued unimpaired and inviolate" is
familiar law.
As against the constitutionality of the Code provision appear
the following general principles: (a) Prior to the adoption of the
Constitution a defendant's right to prove his insanity. at the time
of committing the act was as perfect as his right to prove that
his physical person did not commit the act or set in motion a chain
of events resulting in the act. (b) Due process of law requires that

1 16 Wash. 382.
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a-party shall be properly brought into court and that he shall have
an opportunity when there, to prove any fact which according to
the Constitution, the Statutes- and the usages of the common law,
would be a protection to him or his property. (c) Any method of
procedure which a Legislature -may, in the uncontrolled exercise of
its power, see fit to enact, having for its purpose the deprivation of a
person of his life, liberty or property, is in no sense the process of
law designated and imperatively required by the Constitution.3
(d) The Legislature may not change the rules of evidence as to
deprive parties of such a jury trial as the Constitution -reserved to
them. The rules of evidence may be so changed as to infringe the
constitutional right of trial by jury, or they may be so changed as not
to infringe it. The Legislative power of regulating evidence, like
all other Legislative power, is limited by every right guaranteed by
the Constitution, and- to say the Legislature may regulate evidence
is merely to say that they may make any law on any subject that
infringes no Constitutional right. Otherwise it might be said that
as jury trial is a remedy, and remedies may be altered by the-Legislature, the Legislature may alter jury trial to any extent. 4 (e) Of
what value is the right to -appear and defend" if the Legislature
can clog it with conditions and restrictions which substantially nullify the right? How can due process of law be interpreted if the
Legislature can alter the Constitutional meaning of that phrase?
The idea of the Legislature was, that because of modern humane.
methods in treating those convicted of crime, there remains no
longer arty reason for considering the element of will on the part
of those who commit prohibited acts when their guilt is being determined for the purpose of putting theri in the criminal class for restraint and treatment. Such legislation, says Rudkin, C. J.," is "a
result of the dangers which have been multiplied by the absurd length
to which the defense of insanity has been allowed to go under the
fanciful theories of incompetent and dogmatic witnesses, who have
brought discredit on science and made the names of experts unsavory
in the community. No doubt many criminals have escaped justice
by the weight foolishly given by credulous jurors to evidence which
their common sense should have disregarded. But the remedy is
to be sought by correcting false notions and not by destroying the
safeguards of private liberty."
'It is submitted that the above conceptions may be answered.
"Due process of law" means that a man is to be tried, as every
other man is iried, in accordance with the law of the land in the
State where he is cha7t,'d with the crime. "Due process of law"
does not mean the g
1i body of the law, common and statute,
as it was at the time - Constitution took effect, but rather means
467.

4 Witherbee v. Supervisors, 7o N. Y. 228, and State v. Billings, 55 Minn.
, King v. Hopkins, 57 N. H. 334.
'State v. Strasburg (supra).
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that there must be a competent tribunal to pass on the subject matter;
notice, actual or constructive; an opportunity to appear and produce
evidence, to be heard in person or by counsel; and if the subject
matter involve the determination of the. personal liability of the
defendant, he must be brought within the jurisdiction by service of
process within the State or by his voluntary appearance.6 Such
"ldtie

prQcess" according to State v. Strasburg would always be

forced to remain exactly as it was at the adoption of the Constitution. The provision of the Legislature in this case must have -been,
therefore, part of the law of the land, and the only question is, if

it took away the accused's right to trial by jury.That the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate, means that all the substantial incidents and consequences which pertain to the right of trial by jury are beyond the
reach of legislation, and these are (i) that the jury must be twelve

men, indifferent between the prisoner and the Commonwealth, and to
secure this challenge must be .allowed; (2) the juiry must be summoned from the vicinage where the crime is supposed to have been
committed, as this gives the accused, on the trial, the benefit of his
own good character and standing with his neighbors; (3) the jury

must unanimously concur in the verdict, and (4) the jurors must be
left free to act in accordance with the dictates of their own judg-.
ment.7 The provision that trial by jury shall remain inviolate
applies to the jury as such and cannot be interpreted as the relation

ot the jury to newly created personal disabilities of the prisoner.
The latter must be regulated either by conmon law or the Legislature, and after such personal disabilities are'thus determined, the
prisoner is entitled to his trial by jury. All that the Constitution
aims to do is to retain to the citizens of the State, trial in the form

of a judge and jury in proper cases, and where questions of fact,
so considered by law, must be submitted to the jury.
A large number of cases, though not deciding this Constitutional
point because it was not raised, have held that the Legislature in
statutory crimes may take away the intent. Now insanity as a defense only goes to negative intent, or, at most, whenever a man cominitted a crime, while insane, at common law he was not treated as
he would have been if not insane, and so even under this supposition,
as the question of insanity must be less than that of intent, the
Legislature can take it away.
The substance of the opinion of the court is found in the
following statement of Parker, J.: "The right of trial by jury must
mean that the accused has the right to have the jury pass upon
every substantive fact going to the question of his guilt or innocence. Otherwise the provision of our Constitution * * * would
ben rendered void." While admitting the absolute truth of this
statement we submit that the Legislature may change facts which
constitute guilt or innocence.
T. Wt.B. 3d.
"8 Cyc. io, 83 B.
' State v. Harvey, x68 Mo. 167.
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POWER OF A STATE to REoOKE THE RIGHT OF A FOREIGN CORBcsqEss.-An interesting constitutional qfuestion is presented in considering the validity of a state
law, which provides in substance, that if a foreign corporation
licensed to do an intrastate business by the state, removes a suit
commenced against it in a state court- to a federal court or
-institutes a suit against a citizen of the state in a federal court,
the license of the corporation shall be revoked. A statute so framed
causes two independent rights to clash. The Constitution of the
United States and legislation in pursuance thereof, gives a right
to invoke the federal courts on the ground of the diverse citizenship of the parties to the litigation. Under the doctrine of reserved
powers the states may exclude foreign corporations from doing
intrastate business within their borders. There is no doubt about
the former right. It is self-evident that if a state in so many
words attempted to prevent foreign corporations from availing
themselves of the federal courts, the statute so declaring would be
unconstitutional. But if the latter right exists, is a statute, which
merely sets it forth and proclaims that it will be exercised under
certain circumstances, unconstitutional? In order to answer this'
question, we must examine the cases in which the right ha 'been
recognized, to ascertain its extent.
The cases divide themselves into two classes. In one an intrastate business alone was being done. In the 'other this business
was being carried on in conjunction with interstate commerce. We
will first consider the former. Paul v. Virginia I is the historic case
on the subject. It was m insurance case and insurance has been
consistently held not to be interstate commerce. - Virginia had
imposed a license tax on foreign corporations for the privilege of
doing business in the state. A company attempted to do business
without paying the tax. The court held. that a foreign corporation may be excluded entirely or regulated as, in the judgment of
the state, will best promote the public interest. In the Pembina
Mining Co. v. Penna.- it was said, a foreign corporation not carrying on foreign, or interstate commerce or not employed by the
government of the United States, is dependent on the will of the state
for any recognition. The state can grant it recognition on the payment of a license tax if it so desires. The clause of the Constitution
granting all the privileges mid immunities of citizens in the several
states has no application to foreign corporations. The Fourteenth
Amendment, to the effect that no state shall deprive any person
of the equal protection of the laws, applies to corporations, but
a foreigni corporation is not a corporation outside of the state, of
its creation until recognized. In other words, a licensed foreign
corporation can claim the equal protection of the laws afforded to
PORATION TO DO IxTRASTATE

'8 Wall. i68 (1868).
"N. Y. Life Ins. Co. Y. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389 (igoo).
*125 U. S. i81 (1887).
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domestic corporations, but an unlicensed one cannot. Mr. Justice
Field for the court said in the Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New
York,4 a state may impose as a condition of doing business as a
corporation, the payment of a specific sum each year and may prescribe the mode in which the sum shall be ascertained. There is
no constitutional inhibition against the legislature adopting any mode
to arrive at the sum which it will exact as a condition of the reation of the corporation or of its continued existence. Nor can
there be any greater objection to a similar tax upon a foreign corporation doing business within the state by its permission. A foreign
corporation can claim a right to do business to any extent in another
state only subject to the conditions imposed by its laws. The on!y
exceptions are, where it does an interstate business or where it is
in the employ of the United States. This was affirmed in the later
case of New York v. Roberts.' The same doctrine appears in
Hooper v. California.'
The next class comprises the cases in which the corporations
were engaged in both forms of business. Obviously this complicates
the situation. It is almost axiomatic, to state that interstate commerce is under the control of the Federal government. It has'
been held in numerous cases however, that the intrastate business
may be separated from the interstate and as to the former, foreign
corporations are subject to state control. In the Wells, Fargo Co.
v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,- the court said, "Of course the
right to engage in interstate commerce is not a right to do a local
business within the territory and therefore the plaintiff has no
rights to do business in Washington, Idaho, M6ntana and Dakota."
Crutcher v. Kentucky ' expresses the same thought. In pronouncing
a tax invalid as being ulion interstate commerce, it is said, "But
taxes on license fees in good faith imposed exclusively on express
business carried on wholly within the state, would be open to no
such objection." In Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Charleston,' the
decision bears immediately. The company was a New York corporation doing both kinds of business in the State of South Carolina.
The City of Charleston was a municipal corporation" of the same
state. By an act of. the state legislature, the city was authorized
to impose a license tax on persons engaged in business in the
city. Accordingly a tax was imposed on the company for engaging
in intrastate business in the city. The tax was sustained, although
the company was also transacting an interstate business. It was
only by the grace of the state, that they were permitted to do
tbat sort of business and they. must accept the conditions prescribed
U. S. 305 (1892).
1x U. S. 6s8 (898).
'155 U. S. 648 (085).
1 43

s

'23

Fed. 469 (1884).
U. S. 47 (1891).
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'153 U. S. 692 (1894).
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or cease doing it. In the Waters-Pierce Oil Co: v. Texas,10 the
license of the oil company, a Missouri corporation, was taken away
for a violation of the lairs of Texas and they were- prohibited from
doing intrastate business thereafter. It is expressly stated, that
. business of a Federal nature is excluded from the operation of
this judgment. The next recognition of the principle is in Pullman
Co. v. Adams. 1 The State of Mississippi taxed the intrastate business of the Pullman Company. The latter objected. All the cars
in use in Mississippi were interstate cars and, local business was
done by them at a* loss. and consequently to tax them for engaging in it would burden interstate conm erce. The court decided, since they were free to abandon this business, they must pay
the state tax, if they desired to continue it. This case was affirmed
ia Allen v. Pullman Company.'12 Probably the strongest case decided up to this time is Kehrer v. Stewart.' 3 ' The State of Georgia
imposed a license tax upon all agents of packing houses doing
business in the state. The defendant was an agent for a company
which engaged in both forms of business and objected to the
tax as burdening interstate commerce. The court held, that-since
the tax was for the privilege of ent~aging in intrastate business,
it must be paid by anyone doing that kind of butsiness and it
mattered not. that by far the greater part of the business was
interstate. The only exception was in the case of a man not
regilarly doing an intrastate business but compelled to once in
awhile, when an interstate contract of purchase was broken and
the goods had to be sold in the state.
From these cases it would appear, that the lxwer of a state to
control corporations engaged in intrastate busines 'is absolute
under all conditions. Therefore it would seem that a statute which
merely states that a power acknowledged to he in the states will
lie exercised in. the event of a foreign corporation going into the
Federal courts on the ground of diverse citizenship, is constitutional.
And so it was held in the Security Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Prewitt." It had been decided. if the statute compelled an
agreement in advance to waive the right of involving the Federal
courts it was unconstitutional. 5 Mr. justice Hunt put it on the
ground, that a person could not contract away his constitutional
rights. But when the same justice had the statute that we are considering. before him. he immediately said. no agreement is required here and this is valid.'8 In the Prewitt case the company
was engaged solely in local business. Since the right of exclusion
to 177 U. S. 28 (10oo).
1i89 U. S. 420 (1903).
'91g'U.

171 (1903).

"197 U. S. 6o (t9o5).
"202 U. S."246 (igos).
IlD.. Co. .v.(Nnnct
20 ANoall. 445 (18

tDoyle v. ('outilieual Ills. CO.- 9417L. S.5-

(84).

OS76).

NOTES

as to intrastate business apparently exists, although the company
is also engaged in interstate commerce. we would expect to find,
that the statute as applied to the -local business of interstate
railroad companies had been held constitutional. But the case ofHemdon v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co.' is decided
to the contrary. The decision is based on four cases decided at
the same term of court.'
We will review these decisions. In the Western -Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas the state had imposed a license fee based on
the entire capital stock whether used in or out of Kansas for the
privilege of doing intrastate business. On refusal to pay, ouster
proceedings were commenced. The court in the course of its
opinion says, that the general rule, that a state may exclude foreign
corporations or impose such terms and conditions on their doing
business in the state as in its judgment may -be consistent with
the interests of the people, applies only to corporations engaged
solely in intrastate business. Where the company is aiso engaged in interstate commerce, the exclusion may not be accomplished
by burdening interstate commerce and since the tax imposed in the
present case would directly burden that commerce, it is illegal and
the corporation cannot be excluded for refusal to pay it. To get
around the cases reviewed by us in which the corporations were
excluded from doing a local business, although engaged in interstate
commerce as well. it is said, that in none of these cases was a
direct burden imposed on interstate commerce. The reasons of
public policy for the decision may be best summed up in the words
of the court: -\Ve cannot fail to recognize the intimate connection
which at this day exists between the interstate business done by
interstate companies and the local business which, for the convenience of the people, must be done or can generally be better
and more economically done by such interstate companies rather than
by domestic companies organized to conduct only local business.
It is of the last importance that the freedom of interstate commerce
shall not be trammelled or burdened by local regulations which
under the guise of regulating local affairs, reiilly burden rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. While
the general right of the states to regulate their strictly -domestic
affairs is fundamental in our constitutional system and vital to
the integrity and permanence of that system. that right must always
be exerted in subordination to the granted or enumerated powers
of the general government, and not in hostility to rights secured by
the Supreme Law of the Land.In view of the previous decisions of the Sulreme Court, there
seem to be very excellent grounds for the dissent delivered by Mr.
JU. S. Supreme Ct. Advance Sheets. July

3. 1g1. at page 633.
a W. U. T. Co. v. Kansas. 236 U. S. r (90o) : Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 2z6
U. S. s6 (191o): Ludwig v. W. U. T. Co.. 216 U. S. 146 (igio); Southern
Ry. v. Greene. 216 V. S. 400 (1910).
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Justice Holmes and acquiesced in by the late Chief Justice Fuller
and Mr. Justice McKenna.
The Pullman Co. v. Kansas and Ludwig v. Western Union
Telegraph Co. are in accord with the "lVestern- Union Telegraph
Co. v. Kansas. The Southern Railway v. Greene is decided on
different grounds. On the authority of Pembina Mining Co.
v. PeOina; supra, corporations are within the terms of the "equal
protection of the laws" clause of the Constitution. A licensed
foreign corporation is to be regarded as a corporation and if
the statute, does not embrace domestic corporations, it does not
give equal protection. This argument is expressly used in the.
Herndon case, but is made as an additional reason for invalidating
the statute rather than as the principal reason.
The inevitable conclusion to be-diawn from these cases seems
to us to be, that the Supreme Court has considerably restricted
the long line of cases hitherto decided.
X. S. McK.
COxSTRUCrIV TRUSTS-SUFFICIECY OF EVIDENC-E.-Where a
purchaser at sheriff's sale has promised orally to hold the land in
trust for.the judgment debtor, and after he has taken title has
denied the trust and claims the beneficial interest in the land for
h;mself-under what circumstances should a court of equity compel
him as a constructive trustee to reconvey?
Among other things, it is universally held that if the transaction is attended by -circumstances which show legal fraud on the
part of the purchaser. a constructive trust will arise.: Legal fraud
may be defined as any intentional misstatement of a material fact
by which another is induced to change his position to his detriment.2 The condition of the purchaser's mind at the time he
gets title by an absolute conveyance, is held in most jurisdictions to
he a material fact. Thus, if the judgment debtor has been induced to permit the purchaser to acquire title at the sale for an
inadequate consideration by reason of the purchaser's oral promise
to hold in trust for him when the purchaser had no intention at the
time of performing the promise. a clear case of legal fraud is made
out. But suppose the purchaser made the promise in good faith
but later repudiated it. what are the consequences? It is evident -that
there is no legal fraud in this case because the purchaser truly stated
his intention, which was the inducement to lead the judgment debtor
into the transaction, and the bare fact of inadequacy of consideration
really proves nothing as to the bona fides of the transaction. It is
also evident that the detriment which the latier has sustained is the
same in both cases.
The prevailing American doctrine is to deny relief in the
'Brson v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525 (I888).

'See discussion in Peek Y.Derry. L. R. 14 App. Cas. 54T.

NOTES

261

second case. It is usually expressed in the language that a mere
refusal to perform a parol promise which is void under the Statute
of Frauds, is not a fraud, either at law or in equity.3 This position
has driven the American courts to a more detailed consideration of
what circumstances amount to legal fraud, and the strong equity
in the case has induced them, in some instances, to a liberality
of presumption in favor of fraud.'
The recent case of Harras v. Harras: is, in result, in accord
with the prevailing American doctrine and lays down the rule
that the evidence of legal fraud must be "clear, cogent, and convincing" to enable the court to order a reconveyance. Thus, there
is not even a liberality of presumption in that jurisdiction. The
court enumerates the circumstances surrounding such a transaction
from which fraud may properly be inferred as follows: (i) Where
there existed between the judgment debtor and the purchaser a confidential relation aside from that created by the agreement to p1urclse. (2) Where the judgment debtor supplied a part of the
purchase money. (3) Where the judgment debtor was lulled'into
inactivity by reason of the promise and was prevented from protecting his rights in the land. or refrained therefrom. (4)-Where
the purchaser was, by his promise, enabled to get the land at a
price materially below its actual value. (5) Where the judgment
debtor remained in possession and made valuable improvements.
As practically all of these elemelts were in that case the court
decreed a re-conveyance, but it is submitted that a strict adherence
to the rule of this case would work injustice, not only in a case
where the evidence of legal fraud is less clear, 'but as well' in the
case where there is no evidence of legal fraud.
The fact that it was a judicial sale in the case under discussion is immaterial, and. therefore, for the purpose of simplicity,
it may be well to state the question in another form: Where A
conveys land to B upon oral trust to hold for A, and B repudiates
the trust which he assumed in good faith, does such a case contain sufficient. equity to enable the court to order B, as constructive
trustee, to reconvey to A? In this case, as pointed out above,
it is apparent that when the parties come into court, since B
has paid either no consideration at all or a wholly inadequate
' Wheeler v. Reynolds. 66 N. Y. 227 (1876): Nash v. Jones, 41 W. Va.
769 (1896): Fairchild v. Rasdall, 9 Wis. 379 (1859); Mescall v. Tully, 91
Ind. 96 (883): Calder v. Morgan, 49 Mich. 14 (882); Wolford v. Farnham,
44 Minn. i59 (89o); Marcel v. .Marcel. 70 Neb. 498 (1903); Lovett v. Taylor,
54 N. J. Eq. 311 (1&6): Barry v. Hill, 66 Pa. St. 344 (1895); Baker v.
Baker, 72 Atl. Rep. xooo (N. J. C. i9o9).
Contra: Davis v. Otty. 35 Bear. 208: Haigh v. Kaye. L. R. 7" Ch. App.
17as. 4x9: Marlborough v. WVhitehead. 2 (1. 133 (1894): Cromwell v. Norton,
79 N. E. Rep. 433 (Mass. io6): Dictum-Peacock v. Peacock, 5o Mo. 256, 261.
'Larmon v. Knight. 140 111. 232 (1892): Beegle v. AVentz, 5 P. F. Smith,
369; Boynton v. Housler, 23 P. F. Smith. 453.
'1 o Pac. Rep. io85 (Wash. igio).

'Beegle v. Wentz, and Boynton v. Housler, stpra.
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consideration, he should not- in equity and good conscieice be
allowed to retain the advantage he has acquired over A. The
cases which refuse to order a reconveyance in this case proceed
upon the ground that it would amount to sistaining an oral trust
in land, contrary to the seventh, sectioi of the Statute of Frauds.
Although A would receive the same relief that he would by the.
enforcement of the express trust, it is submitted that this is a
mere coincidence. As pointed out by the late Professor Ames, the
prevailing American doctrine which leaves A without remedy, grows
out of the failure of the courts to distinguish between -specific
performance of an agreement and compulsory, restitution of the
consideration for the agreement.7 A's right of restitutio in intigrum
seems as strong in this case as in the case where a cest iii qte trust has
parted with a valuable consideratipn relying upon the oral promise
of the owner of land to hold in trust for him which, the promisor
later repudiates. Yet in this latter case the courts uniformly compel
the promisor to restore the consideration to the promisee, regardless of whether the circumstances of the case show legal fraud.
Similarly, one who has received money for an oral promise to
convey land. and, refuses to convey, must refund the money.,'
It also seens anomalous that American courts which will admit
oral evidence to show that an absolute conveyance was infended
to operate as a mortgage-and which hold that the mere proof
of that intention at the time of the transaciion is sufficient to
establish the grantor's equity irrespective of the presence or absence
of strict legal fraud-will deny relief in this case which involves the
same equity.'
If these principles may properly be applied to the case of an
execution sale upon a judgment. it is submitted that the equity of
the judgment debtor arises as soon as he proves the existence of an
oral trust agreement and a subsequent breach, and that the only
decree which will give him complete relief is one which restores
him to the status quo. viz.: reconveyance by the purchaser and a
restoration by him to the purchaser of any money that has been spent
by the latter in the transaction.
J.F.S.

"Constructive Trusts Based Upon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust
in Land.-2o Har. Law R., at p. 552.
'Cook v.Doggett, 2 Allen (Mass.). 439; Gilbert v. Maynard, 15 Johns (N.
Y.), Rineer v. Rollins, 156 Pa. St. 342.
'Campbell v. Dearborn, log Mass. z3o.

